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Abstract
This study assesses the impact of children’s health insurance programs on health care utilization and health care
expenditures of children from 6 to 14 years old in Vietnam using four rounds of the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Surveys from 2006 to 2012. We find a positive effect of both student and free health insurance programs
on the number of health care visits. This positive impact tends to increase over time, and the impact of the free
health insurance program is larger than the impact of the student health insurance program. Regarding out-of-pocket
health expenditures per visit, we find a reducing effect on this outcome of the free health insurance program but not
the student health insurance program.
Keywords: Child health insurance, Impact evaluation, Health care utilization, Out-of-pocket expenditures, Vietnam
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Background
Child health has received a great deal of attention in all
the countries. Improvement of child health in low-income
countries is challenging because of nutrition problems
and poor health care services. The rate of stunting among
children under-five years of age (height-for-age below −2
SD) was 36 in Africa and 27 % in Asia in 2011 [1]. In low-
income countries, the under-five mortality rate was 76
deaths per 1000 live births in 2013, while the under-five
mortality rate in high-income countries was just around 6
deaths per 1000 live births [2]. Improving child health and
reducing the mortality rate are among important objec-
tives of Millennium Development Goals.
Among health programs, health insurance is a key one
to help households improve health and avoid cata-
strophic health expenditures. Firstly, health care costs
are often high for the poor households, and this high
cost may lead to a delay in using health care when they
are sick. Thus, health insurance can increase health care
utilization, and improve health status of people. Sec-
ondly, when a person suffers from negative health events
such as accidents or chronic diseases, their medical ex-
penses increase substantially (for example, [3–5]). To
cover the health care costs, poor households might have
to reduce other consumptions and investment, and sell
some of their goods. There are evidences that even a
short term health event can push some households into
long-term poverty (e.g., [6, 7]). Health insurance helps
households reduce the out-of-pocket expenditures in-
cluding catastrophic health expenditures (e.g., [8–10]).
Vietnam has been very successful in poverty reduction
in the recent decades. However, child health remains an
important problem in Vietnam. In 2011, 23.3 of children
under five in Vietnam were under normal height (height-
for-age below −2 SD) and 12 % of children under five
years old were under normal weight (weight-for-age below
–2SD). Children in low expenditure quintiles are more
likely to be under normal weight and height compared to
those in high expenditure quintile [11]. Children in poor
household are also more vulnerable to illness [11]. With-
out proper treatment, illness can have adverse impacts on
children’s health and education. These adverse impacts
can be mitigated if children have health insurance.
The government of Vietnam has implemented policies
to increase the health insurance coverage for children.
Children under 6 years old are provided with free health
care services. For children from 6 to 14 years old, there
are two main health insurance programs, which are op-
erated by Vietnam Health Insurance Organization (VHI)
on non-profit and public basis. The first is student
health insurance, which is provided for school children
Correspondence: nguyen.cuong@ippm.edu.vn; http://ideas.repec.
org/e/png36.html
National Economics University, Hanoi, Vietnam
© 2016 Nguyen. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
license, and indicate if changes were made.
Nguyen Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:34 
DOI 10.1186/s13561-016-0111-9
on a voluntary basis. The second program is free health
insurance for the poor children, and children in ethnic
minorities and other policy households such as house-
holds with war merit or invalid members. According to
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys, 62.8 of
children age from 6 to 14 were enrolled in at least a
health insurance program in 2006 and this rate increased
to 88.6 % in 2012.
Although there is no doubt about the necessity of
health insurance programs in Vietnam, there exist
questions on their effectiveness. They are sometimes to
blame for poor health care services (e.g., [11, 12]). In-
sured people must use the health care services in a
local medical clinic that they registered when purchas-
ing health insurance. The mechanism can limit health
care utilization of people, especially those with high
mobility. In addition, there is a large geographic vari-
ation in the quality of health care services in Vietnam.
In mountainous and remote areas, health care services
are poorly provided [13]. For example, the average dis-
tance from households under the most difficult com-
munes (under the Program 135) in Vietnam to the
nearest hospital is around 21 km [13, 14]. On the con-
trary, in urban areas, especially in large cities, hospitals
are often overwhelmed by high utilization. As a result,
30 % of insured people did not use health insurance
when using health care services in 2012 (according to
the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 2012).
People tend to chose to pay directly to health service
providers to receive fast health treatment.
The impact of health insurance has been receiving a
great amount of attention from scientists as well as pol-
icy makers. There are a large number of empirical stud-
ies on the impact of health insurance programs in both
high and low income countries. There are two important
issues in empirical studies. Firstly, the impact of health
insurance on health care utilization and out-of-pocket
expenditures is not known a priori. Positive impacts of
health insurance on health care demand and utilization
are found in several studies such as [15–19]. However,
other studies find limited effects of health insurance on
health care utilization and expenditures e.g., [20–22].
Regarding the effect on out-of-pocket expenditures,
several studies find a significant effect of health insurance
on out-of-pocket expenditure reduction e.g. [8–10], while
others do not find such a significant effect (e.g., [5]). Sec-
ondly, most studies look at the impact of health insurance
on overall population, not children, e.g., [10, 15–19, 21, 22].
Child-targeted health insurance programs have been in-
troduced in few low and middle income countries, and
there is little evidence on the impact of these health in-
surance programs [23].
In Vietnam, the impact of health insurance has been
evaluated quantitatively in a number of studies, and the
empirical results are not consistent. Most studies find
that health insurance helps the insured people increase
health care utilization [8, 24–27]. Health insurance is
also found to reduce out-of-pocket health expenditures
[8, 24–26]. On the contrary, [28] does not find a signifi-
cant impact of health insurance on health care
utilization, and [27] does not find a significant impact
on out-of-pocket health expenditures.
Regarding child health insurance, two studies assessing
the impact of free health insurance on children under age
6 in Vietnam are [23] and [29]. Nguyen et al. [29] finds a
positive impact of health insurance on hospital visits of
children and a reduction in health expenses, whilst [23]
show a positive impact of health insurance on health care
visits of children under age 6, but no significant im-
pacts on expenditures per visit. Possible reasons for dif-
ferent findings in these two studies are differences in
data sets and methodology. Nguyen et al. [29] uses data
from the 2004 and 2006 Vietnam Living Standard Surveys
(VHLSS) and difference-in-differences estimators, whilst
[23] relies on data from the 2006, 2008 and 2010
VHLSSs, and regression discontinuity regressions1.
Empirical findings on the impact of health insurance
on children’s health care, especially in Vietnam, remain
limited. Thus in this study, we will examine whether the
student health insurance and free health insurance affect
health care utilization and health spending of children
from 6 to 14 year old in Vietnam. This study is expected
to have several contributions. Firstly, we provide empir-
ical findings on the impact of health insurance on chil-
dren aged from 6 to 14. This group of children have not
been assessed in previous studies. The impact of health
insurance on children can be different from the impact
of health insurance on adults. Moreover, the decision to
use health care service does depend not only on children
but also heavily on their parents and caregivers. Sec-
ondly, the study will measure the effect of two health in-
surance programs for children including student health
insurance and free health insurance. The two types of
health insurance are targeted at different groups and
they can have different impacts on children. Thirdly,
we will use more recent data from Vietnam Household
Living Standard Surveys from 2006 to 2012. Health in-
surance as well as health care have been change signifi-
cantly in Vietnam, and the impact of health insurance
can differ from one to another period.
The paper is structured into four sections. The sec-
ond section presents data and methods used in this
study. This section also describes health insurance
programs and health care utilization of children in
Vietnam. The third section discusses empirical results
of the impact measurement of health insurance pro-
grams on children. Finally, the fourth section presents
some discussions and conclusions.
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Method
Data set
In this study, we will use data from the recent Vietnam
Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in years
2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. These surveys were conducted
by General Statistical Office of Vietnam with technical
supports of the World Bank. The sampling frame of the
2006 and 2008 VHLSSs is based on the 1999 Population
and Housing Census of Vietnam. Since 2010, VHLSSs use
the 2009 Population and Housing Census of Vietnam as
the sampling frame. Each of the 2006 VHLSS and the
2008 VHLSS covers 9,189 households, while each of the
2010 VHLSS and the 2012 VHLSS covers 9,399 house-
holds. The VHLSSs are representative for the national,
rural and urban, and regional levels.
It’s very useful that VHLSSs have a sub-sample of panel
households and individuals. In the VHLSSs, communes are
selected randomly as primary sampling units. The number
of selected communes in each of the 2006 and 2008
VHLSSs is 3,063, while the number of selected communes
in each of the 2010 and 2012 VHLSSs is 3,132.2 Around
three households are randomly selected in each commune.
Regarding panel data, in each VHLSS, 50 % of communes
are randomly selected and all the sampled households in
these selected communes will be resampled in the succeed-
ing VHLSS to construct panel data. The 2006 and 2008
VHLSSs contain a panel of 4,090 households and 15,475 in-
dividuals, while the 2010 and 2012 VHLSSs contain a panel
of 4,157 households and 15,011 individuals. There are no
panel data between the 2008 VHLSS and the 2010 VHLSS,
since they rely on different sampling frames. The attrition
rate in the panel data of VHLSS is around 8 % mainly be-
cause of migration problem. However, households in the
panel data are still representative and there are no serious
attrition problems in VHLSSs [30].
The VHLSSs contain very detailed information on
household and individual characteristics. Information on
households and individuals includes demography, employ-
ment and labor force participation, education, health, in-
come, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and durable
goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation
programs. The surveys contain information on enrolment
in different health insurance types, out-of-pocket expendi-
tures on inpatient and outpatient treatments, other ex-
penses on health care, health care utilization, the number
of health care visits during the 12 months before the inter-
view for all the sampled individuals.
Health insurance and health care of children in Vietnam
In Vietnam, health insurance has been implemented by the
government since 1992. Nowadays, there are three main
schemes of health insurance in Vietnam. The first is com-
pulsory health insurance which is applied for employees in
formal sectors.3 The second is voluntary health insurance.
The third is free health insurance, which is provided freely
for the poor and people in policy families such as fam-
ilies with war merit and invalid members and ethnic
minority families. The compulsory and free health in-
surance are provided by the government, while the vol-
untary health insurance can be provided by both public
and private health insurance providers.
Health insurance for children have been increasing
during the recent years. The percentage of children from
6 to 14 years old without health insurance decreased
from 37.2 % in 2006 to 11.4 % in 2012 (Fig. 1). Rural
children and Kinh/Hoa children are less likely to have a
health insurance than urban and ethnic minority chil-
dren, but this gap is not large. In the recent years, chil-
dren from ethnic minorities are provided with free
health insurance from the government.
Children under age 6 are provided with free health insur-
ance. The main programs of health insurance for children
since age 6 are student health insurance and free health
insurance. The student health insurance program is volun-
tary, and users must pay for that. The average fee of student
health insurance is around VND 80,000 (approximately
USD 4 in January 2012) for one year. It should be noted
that the schooling rate is very high in Vietnam, at around
95% for the primary and lower-secondary school. Children
who are not enrolled in school can purchase voluntary
health insurance. The proportion of children having this
kind of health insurance is very low, around 1 % in the
2012 VHLSS. In this study, we define children with student
health insurance as those who have either student health
insurance or other types of voluntary health insurance4.
The second program of health insurance is free health
insurance for the poor, ethnic minorities in difficult areas,
and policy families. The provision of health insurance for
the poor has been supported by “Health Care Fund for the
Poor” (HCFP) since 2003. The annual amount that is used
to subsidize a beneficiary is about VND 70000 (approxi-
mately USD 3.5) for one year. Members in households
who are classified as the poor by commune authorities
can be eligible for this health insurance program. In
addition, children in policy families (including families
with war merit and invalid members, and families in eth-
nic minorities, and areas of special difficulties) can be also
provided with free health insurance.
Table 1 presents the coverage of the two health insurance
programs for different child groups over the period 2006–
2012. The two health insurance programs are mutually ex-
clusive. The coverage of the both health insurance pro-
grams increased overtime. The percentage of children who
were insured with the student health insurance increased
from 52.3 % in 2006 to 62.8 % in 2012. During the same
period, the percentage of children insured with the free
health insurance increased from 10.4 % to 25.7 %. It should
be noted that there was a shift from student health
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insurance to free health insurance for ethnic minority and
poor children due to the government’s expansion of free
health insurance. The free health insurance program has
reached the poor and ethnic minority children very well. In
2012, 80 of ethnic minority children and 68 % of poor chil-
dren were enrolled in the free health insurance program.
There might be at least two possible reasons why some
school children do not have health insurance. Firstly, health
insurance fees can be relatively costly for some poor house-
holds. According to a survey on willingness to pay for vol-
untary health insurance which was conducted by National
Economics University and World Bank in 2005, 20% of
people did not buy health insurance because of the high
cost [31]. Secondly, as mentioned in the introduction sec-
tion health insurance is sometimes to blame for poor health
care services and complicated payment request. Some
households are not interested in having health insurance
for their children (National Economics University and
World Bank: Results from willingness to pay for health in-
surance survey, unpublished).
To understand selection into child health insurance, we
run a multinomial logit regression of health insurance of
different explanatory variables using the sample of children
aged 6 to 14 in the 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 VHLSSs.
Children are enrolled in either student health insurance or
free health insurance. The reference group is children with-
out any health insurance. The description and summary
statistics of explanatory variables are presented in Table 6
in Appendix. Since the 2006 and 2008 VHLSSs are based
on a different sampling frame from the 2010 and 2012
Table 1 Percentage of children with student health insurance and free health insurance
Percentage of children having student health insurance Percentage of children having free health insurance
2006 2008 2010 2012 2006 2008 2010 2012
By gender
Girls 52.5 64.0 58.9 63.4 10.9 18.3 23.5 25.5
Boys 52.2 62.3 59.5 62.3 10.0 19.6 22.3 25.9
Ethnicity
Kinh, Hoa 59.6 67.1 71.8 76.5 8.3 14.3 8.9 11.0
Ethnic minorities 12.3 42.9 10.5 12.3 22.4 42.7 77.3 80.1
Poverty status
Non-Poor 61.8 70.5 72.7 76.4 6.5 11.4 8.5 12.1
Poor 17.1 33.0 29.9 20.5 25.2 49.8 54.2 68.2
Urban status
Urban 76.6 76.7 83.0 84.2 5.2 7.3 5.9 8.8
Rural 45.6 59.5 52.3 56.7 11.9 22.1 27.8 30.6
Total 52.3 63.2 59.2 62.8 10.4 18.9 22.9 25.7
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
Fig. 1 Percentage of children without a health insurance. Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006 and 2012
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VHLSS, we run one model using the pooled 2006 and 2008
VHLSSs and another model using the pooled 2010 and
2012 VHLSSs.
Table 2 shows children from Kinh and Hoa, and those
from high income households are more likely to be enrolled
in the student health insurance program but less likely to
be enrolled in the free health insurance program. Schooling
children are strongly correlated with student health insur-
ances as well as free health insurance. Children in high in-
come households are more likely to have student health
insurance. Children in low income households are more
likely to have free health insurance, since the free health in-
surance program is targeted at the poor and disadvanta-
geous groups. Education of household heads and spouses
are strongly correlated with student health insurance. Re-
garding the free health insurance, education of household
heads and heads’ spouse is less correlated with free health
insurance of children. However, children in a household
with a head or head’s spouse with post-secondary education
are more likely to have free health insurance. It implies the
role of parental education in getting children insured by
health insurance.
In Table 3, we examine the health care outcomes of chil-
dren over the period 2006–2012. Overall, the health care
pattern was quite stable overtime. The percentage of chil-
dren using health care services was 33.5 in 2006 and
32.8 % in 2012. The number of health care visits decreased
slightly from 0.928 in 2006 to 0.854 in 2012. In this study,
the health care visits include both outpatient and inpatient
health care visits. For children in VHLSSs, only around
3 % of them had inpatient health care visits (around 70 to
80 children in each VHLSS). Thus we cannot examine
outpatient and inpatient visits separately.
The association between the health insurance pro-
grams and the number of health care visits is not clear
in Table 3. Insured children had more health care visits
than insured children in 2006, but the trend was reverse
in 2012. To understand the impact of health insurance,
we will use econometric method in the next sections.
Econometric method
In this study, we will rely on econometric regression
methods to estimate the impact of health insurance on
health care utilization of children. We start with the basic
health capital model of [32, 33], in which the demand for
‘good health’ are inherited stock of health, the shadow
price of ‘good health’ commodity, household income and
prices of other commodities. The shadow price in turn de-
pends on price of medical care, education, and other fac-
tors. Health insurance is expected to decrease the medical
care and increase the health care demand.
In our econometric model, we assume a health care
variable is a reduced-function of characteristics of
households and individuals as follows:
Y it ¼ β0 þ Hitβ1 þ Xitβ2 þ Titβ3 þ ui þ εit ð1Þ
where Yit is an indicator of health care utilization of
child i in year t. Health care utilization is measured by
the number of annual health care visits. H is a vector of
dummy variables of enrolment in the student health in-
surance and free health insurance programs (it is equal
one for the insured and zero for the uninsured). X is a
vector of household-level and child-level characteristics.
T is the time dummy. In the sample of the 2006 and
2008 VHLSSs, T equals one for the 2008 year and zero
for the 2006 year, and in the sample of the 2010 and
2012 VHLSSs, T equals one for the 2012 year and zero
for the 2010 year. ui and εit denotes time-invariant and
time-variant unobserved variables, respectively. It should
be noted that since the number of annual health care visits
is a count variable, Poisson regression will be used [34].
The key problem in estimating the impact of health in-
surance is endogeneity of health insurance. Parent who
pay more attention to their children’s health can be
more likely to buy health insurance for children and
bring their children to health care centers more often
when children are sick. In this study, we use panel data
fixed-effects regressions to remove the endogeneity bias
due to time-invariant unobserved. Fixed-effect regres-
sion will, however, fail to remove all endogeneity bias if
the unobserved variables which affect health care out-
comes and health insurance are not time-invariant.
A source of endogeneity can be adverse selection in
health insurance. Adverse selection happens when
people with poor health are more likely to enrolled in
health insurance [35]. Less healthy children are more
likely to have health insurance, and at the same time
they are more likely to use health care services. As a re-
sult, we can overestimate the impact of health insurance
on health care utilization. In our study, the adverse se-
lection might be more likely to occur with the student
health insurance program than the free health insurance
program, since the student health insurance program is
more based on the voluntary bias.
The extent of adverse selection into health insurance
has been examined in a large number of studies, and there
is not obvious evidence. Several studies find evidence of
adverse selection, while other do not find it (e.g., see [36]
for a review). In this study, we test the adverse election by
running probit regression of children’s enrolment into
health insurance in the current period on health variables
in the previous. We do not regress health insurance enrol-
ment on health variables in the same period to avoid re-
verse causality. Having health insurance can improve
health by increasing health care utilization. We use the
2006 and 2008 VHLSSs, since these two VHLSSs contain
question on whether individuals were sick during the past
4 weeks and the during the past 12 months (before the
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Table 2 Multinomial logit regression of the probability of children having health insurance
Explanatory variables Estimation using
VHLSSs 2006 and 2008
Estimation using
VHLSSs 2010 and 2012
Enrolled in student health
insurance in 2008
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Enrolled in free health
insurance in 2008
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Enrolled in student health
insurance in 2008
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Enrolled in free health
insurance in 2008
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Age 0.0122 −0.0897*** −0.0407* −0.0052
(0.0178) (0.0258) (0.0241) (0.0285)
Sex (male = 1, female = 0) −0.0250 0.0521 −0.0457 −0.0977
(0.0757) (0.1061) (0.1056) (0.1313)
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1) −0.5868*** 0.0549 −0.6287*** 2.0530***
(0.1190) (0.1532) (0.1811) (0.1689)
Attending school 2.4796*** 1.2287*** 2.4920*** 0.8578***
(0.1744) (0.1974) (0.2478) (0.2255)
Log of per capita income 0.4629*** −1.3994*** 0.6031*** −1.4203***
(0.0797) (0.1233) (0.1034) (0.1444)
Household size −0.0125 0.0060 0.1177*** 0.0051
(0.0268) (0.0376) (0.0395) (0.0446)
Proportion of children in households 0.4780 1.0777*** 0.1684 −0.5964
(0.2989) (0.3987) (0.4015) (0.4757)
Proportion of elderly in households 0.7076 −0.5008 1.8244*** 1.6999**
(0.4471) (0.6530) (0.6394) (0.7518)
Age of household head 0.0129*** −0.0038 0.0011 −0.0165**
(0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0079)
Sex of head (male = 1, female = 0) −0.1260 −0.1689 −0.1347 −0.0613
(0.1388) (0.1982) (0.2004) (0.2871)
Household head without education degree Reference
Household head with primary education 0.3605*** −0.0435 0.1820 −0.0655
(0.1134) (0.1436) (0.1499) (0.1748)
Household head with lower-secondary 0.4131*** −0.1108 0.5080*** 0.3832*
(0.1247) (0.1758) (0.1822) (0.2207)
Household head with upper-secondary 0.4088*** −0.4701* 0.5343** 0.1113
(0.1508) (0.2411) (0.2201) (0.3228)
Household head with post-secondary 1.7410*** 3.1364*** 0.3392 −0.8047
(0.5241) (0.6266) (0.3919) (0.6589)
Household head without spouse Reference
Household head’s spouse without education −0.2191 0.4239* 0.9196*** 0.8790***
(0.1820) (0.2436) (0.2835) (0.3404)
Household head’s spouse with primary 0.1722 −0.0040 0.4683*** −0.1166
(0.1154) (0.1542) (0.1451) (0.1822)
Household head’s spouse with lower- 0.0630 −0.0148 0.5328*** −0.5900**
(0.1322) (0.1902) (0.1790) (0.2376)
Household head’s spouse with upper- 0.4033** 0.2558 0.5491** −0.1479
(0.1787) (0.2996) (0.2440) (0.3709)
Household head’s spouse with post- 1.6187** 1.3179 1.4439*** 2.4847***
(0.6789) (0.8870) (0.5519) (0.7544)
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interview date). Table 7 in Appendix presents the multi-
nomial logit regression of enrolment in health insurance
in 2008 on health and health care utilization in 2006 using
different model specifications. All the health and health
care variables are not significant. The magnitude of point
estimate are also very small. Thus we expect that the
endogeneity bias in measuring the impact of health insur-
ance is small after child-level and household-level time-
invariant unobserved variables and other observed vari-
ables are controlled.
Around 65 % of children in Vietnam did not visit health
care providers in our data (Table 3). There are not data on
out-of-pocket expenditures for children without health
care. When there are many zero values of the dependent
variable, we can use a Tobit model. However, there are no
available fixed-effects Tobit estimators due to an inciden-
tal parameter problem in maximum likelihood methods
[37]. Instead of fixed-effects Tobit models, we use a two-
part model which is often used in health economics to
model a variable with a large number of zero values [38,
39]. We estimate the two-part model in the context of
fixed-effects panel data as follows:
Dit ¼ αD þ HitβD þ XitθD þ TtγD þ ui þ εit ; ð2Þ
Y it ¼ αY þ HitβY þ XitθY þ TtγY þ ηi þ vit f or Y it > 0;
ð3Þ
where Yit is out-of-pocket expenditures per visit of child
i in year t. Dit is a binary variable which equals 1 if Yit >
0 and 0 if Yit = 0. Tt is the time dummy. H is health in-
surance enrolment, and X is a vector of other control vari-
ables. ui and ηi denote time-invariant unobserved
variables, while εit and vit denote time-variant unobserved
variables. Low subscripts D and Y in parameters of equa-
tion (2) and (3) denote parameters in models of Dit and
Yit, respectively. We estimate both equations (2) and (3)
using fixed-effects regressions.
It should be noted that we estimate equation (2) using
a fixed-effects linear probability regression. Linear prob-
ability models are also widely used to estimate the effect
of an explanatory variable on the probability of the
dependent variable (e.g., [40, 41]).5 It is easier to inter-
pret the marginal effect from linear probability models.
Results
Table 4 presents fixed-effects regressions of the number
of annual health visits and health expenditures on health
insurance. Table 8 in Appendix presents regressions
without fixed-effects for comparison. The control vari-
ables include log of per capita income, household com-
position and the number of doctors and the number of
hospitals per 1000 people of provinces. The health insur-
ance coverage within a province can be correlated with
the capacity of provision of health care services of the
province. Variables that time-invariants such as age and
gender of children, education and demographic variables
of parents are controlled, but they are dropped in the
fixed-effects regression. We do not include health status,
since these variables are endogenous and might affect
health insurance selection. We use a small set of ex-
planatory variables which are exogenous to health insur-
ance. Controlled variables should not be affected by the
treatment variable of interest [42, 43].
It shows that the both school and free health insurance
programs have a positive and significant effect on the
number of health care visits. The impact of the free
health insurance program is higher than the impact of
Table 2 Multinomial logit regression of the probability of children having health insurance (Continued)
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) 0.3476*** −0.5764*** 0.5644*** −0.0672
(0.1122) (0.2011) (0.1595) (0.2254)
Number of doctors per 1000 people 2.5881*** 2.0884*** −0.1325 −0.1207
(0.3257) (0.4800) (0.4587) (0.5366)
Number of hospital per 1000 people −37.7050*** −18.9089 1.5484 52.7175***
(10.4348) (15.7174) (14.1803) (18.0295)
Dummy year (2008 or 2012)a 0.9342*** 1.6824*** 0.3227** 1.0438***
(0.0886) (0.1272) (0.1270) (0.1619)
Constant −8.0450*** 9.0468*** −7.8169*** 11.5076***
(0.8438) (1.2592) (1.1648) (1.4951)
Observations 5,013 5,013 4,110 4,110
R-squared 0.188 0.188 0.345 0.345
Note: aDummy years: for regressions using the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2008 and 0 for 2006. For regressions using the 2010 and
2012 VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2012 and 0 for 2010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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the student health insurance program. Since our model
is Possion, our estimate can be interpreted as follows. In
the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS sample, the student health in-
surance and free health insurance programs increased
the number of health care visits of children by approxi-
mately 12.4 and 20.1 %, respectively. The impact of
health insurance was higher in the 2010–2012 period
than in the 2006–2008 period. The student health insur-
ance and free health insurance programs increased the
number of health care visits of children by approxi-
mately 13.6 and 66.1 %, respectively. The finding on the
positive effect of health insurance on health care
utilization of children is also found in [23] and [29].
The health insurance programs have positive signs in
the regressions of the probability of having out-of-
pocket health expenditures, but most of them are not
significant. Only the effect of the free health insurance
on the probability of having out-of-pocket expenditures
is significant in the 2010–2012 period. Having free
health insurance increased the probability of having out-
of-pocket expenditures by 14 %.
Although the point estimates of the student health in-
surance on out-of-pocket health expenditures per visit
are negative, these estimates are not statistically signifi-
cant. This finding is consistent with findings from [23].
However, the free health insurance reduced the out-of-
pocket health expenditures per visit strongly, especially
in the period 2010–2012. More specifically, having free
health insurance reduced the out-of-pocket health ex-
penditures per visit by around 15.8 in the period 2006–
2008 and 63.4 % in the period 2010–2012. This finding
implies that health insurance is more useful for the low
income households in reducing the burden of health
care expenditures.
In Table 5, we include interactions between health insur-
ance and several characteristics of children in regression of
health care visits to see whether the effect of health insur-
ance on health care utilization differs for different child
groups. Boys and girls have different health status and they
can have different patterns of health care utilization. How-
ever we do not find a different impact of health insurance
between boys and girls.
Some studies find that health care demand is more elas-
tic to the health care cost for the poor households [44, 45].
Because of budget constraints, the poor are less likely to
use health care services than the rich. However, health in-
surance reduces the cost of health care, and as a result the
effect of health insurance is expected to be higher on the
poor than the rich. Table 5 shows a higher effect of free
health insurance for low income households in the period
2010–2012. It implies the important role of health insur-
ance in increasing access to health care services for
Table 3 Health care variables of children








% having health care visits 36.24 38.07 28.42 33.52
Number of health care visits 0.998 1.008 0.806 0.928
Out-of-pocket expenditures per child 113.5 38.3 106.9 103.2
Out-of-pocket expenditures per visit 144.7 53.1 161.4 139.1
The 2008 VHLSS
% having health care visits 29.49 29.02 23.54 28.34
Number of health care visits 0.726 0.680 0.698 0.713
Out-of-pocket expenditures per child 149.6 71.7 123.1 130.1
Out-of-pocket expenditures per visit 275.6 139.6 219.5 240.9
The 2010 VHLSS
% having health care visits 36.62 34.33 25.68 34.14
Number of health care visits 1.019 0.869 0.717 0.931
Out-of-pocket expenditures per child 198.1 83.3 102.8 154.8
Out-of-pocket expenditures per visit 315.9 127.7 149.6 250.3
The 2012 VHLSS
% having health care visits 33.72 31.36 30.67 32.76
Number of health care visits 0.842 0.766 1.112 0.854
Out-of-pocket expenditures per child 169.8 129.0 162.1 158.4
Out-of-pocket expenditures per visit 274.4 280.3 180.9 265.8
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
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children in low income households in Vietnam. However,
we find a larger effect of health insurance in urban areas
than in rural areas, possibly because the high quality of
health care services is more available than in urban areas.
Urban people are more likely to visit health care providers
than rural people when having health insurance.
Finally we include the interactions between parental
education (the number of completed educational grades)
and health insurance programs. All the interactions have
positive sign. The interactions between father’s educa-
tion and the student health insurance is significant in
the 2006–2008 VHLSS panel, while the interactions be-
tween mother’s education and the free health insurance
is significant in the 2010–2012 VHLSS panel. The im-
pact of health insurance on health care utilization is
higher for children with higher education parents. In
other words, when having health insurance more edu-
cated parents are more likely to use health care services
for their children than less educated parents.
Discussion and Conclusion
Vietnam has been very successful in increasing the cover-
age of health insurance for the children recently. The per-
centage of children who were insured with the student
health insurance program increased from 52.3 % in 2006
to 62.8 % in 2012. During the same period, the percentage
of children insured with the free health insurance program
increased from 10.4 % in 2006 to 25.7 % in 2012.
An important question is whether the fast expansion of
health insurance is accompanied with an increase in
health care utilization for children, especially those in low-
Table 4 Individual fixed-effects regression of health care of children

















Student health insurance 0.1242* 0.0077 −0.2732 0.1357* 0.0064 −0.0596
(0.0676) (0.0232) (0.1682) (0.0770) (0.0350) (0.2609)
Free health insurance 0.2008** 0.0144 −0.1580** 0.6605*** 0.1398*** −0.6341*
(0.0948) (0.0282) (0.0740) (0.1178) (0.0419) (0.3536)
Enrolment in school 0.0221 0.0249 0.0191 0.0311 0.0212 0.5818
(0.1129) (0.0381) (0.3453) (0.1392) (0.0561) (0.3701)
Log of per capita income 0.0201 0.0234 −0.0077 0.1140 0.0269 −0.1908
(0.0667) (0.0273) (0.1957) (0.0705) (0.0300) (0.1940)
Household size −0.2693*** −0.0106 −0.1372 0.0116 −0.0105 −0.0141
(0.0423) (0.0158) (0.1435) (0.0497) (0.0126) (0.1406)
Proportion of children −0.0293 0.0431 1.2379 −0.1327 −0.1829 −0.0789
(0.2799) (0.0955) (0.7870) (0.3252) (0.1212) (0.9634)
Proportion of elderly 0.3749 0.2408 −0.3678 0.2187 0.0948 −0.5288
(0.6170) (0.2146) (1.6220) (0.7066) (0.2687) (1.9081)
Number of doctors per
1000 people
0.4352 −0.0825 2.1253 0.4993 −0.0973 −1.0901
(0.6049) (0.1960) (1.7182) (0.3444) (0.1326) (1.1539)
Number of hospital per
1000 people
−0.1009 −0.0826 −0.0838 0.2649 −0.0772 0.0661
(0.8291) (0.0987) (0.1260) (0.1944) (0.0601) (0.3292)
Dummy year
(2008 or 2012)a
−0.4648*** −0.0580** 0.4503** −0.4183*** −0.0472* 0.0191
(0.0717) (0.0266) (0.2210) (0.0563) (0.0249) (0.1675)
Constant 0.2047 3.9243* 0.2988 6.4762***
(0.2877) (2.1315) (0.3188) (2.1145)
Observations 2,296 5,013 1,279 2,008 4,110 1,094
R-squared 0.005 0.080 0.017 0.033
Note: aDummy years: for regressions using the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2008 and 0 for 2006. For regressions using the 2010 and
2012 VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2012 and 0 for 2010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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income households. This paper examines the effect of stu-
dent health insurance and free health insurance on the
health care utilization and health expenditure for children
from 6 to 14 years old in Vietnam using Vietnam House-
hold Living Standard Surveys in 2006, 2008, 2010 and
2012. It finds that both student health insurance and free
health insurance programs help children increase the
number of health care visits. Health insurance tends to
have an increasing impact overtime, and the free health
insurance program has a higher impact than student
health insurance program. Regarding the impact of out-
of-pocket health expenditures per visit, we find that
free health insurance but not student health insurance
reduces the out-of-pocket health expenditures per visit
strongly, especially in the period 2010–2012. The effect
of health insurance on health utilization is higher for
children in low-income households and high-education
parents.
This study shows the important role of health insur-
ance in accessing health care services for children, espe-
cially those from for low income households in Vietnam.
Accordingly, provision of health insurance can contrib-
ute to improve access to health care services for chil-
dren. This study also highlights the importance role of
education of parents in children’s health care. Children
with more educated parents are more likely not only to
have health insurance but also to use it. Thus, improving
knowledge and education for parents is important in in-
creasing the coverage of health insurance as well as
health care utilization for children.
Table 5 Individual fixed-effects regression of the number of health care visits with interactions
Explanatory variables
Panel data VHLSSs 2006–2008 Panel data VHLSSs 2010–2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Student health insurance 0.0798 0.1624** -1.1371 -0.2292 0.2800** 0.0067 0.7745 -0.0289
(0.0898) (0.0740) (0.7859) (0.1965) (0.1174) (0.0941) (1.0848) (0.1822)
Free health insurance 0.0860 0.0768 -1.7266 0.5155** 0.8661*** 0.6073*** 3.3580*** -0.1226
(0.1354) (0.1019) (1.3240) (0.2275) (0.1815) (0.1267) (1.2659) (0.2643)
Student health insurance × Gender
(boy = 1, girl = 0)
0.0965 -0.2511
(0.1285) (0.1543)
Free health insurance × Gender
(boy = 1, girl = 0)
0.2195 -0.3556
(0.1821) (0.2373)
Student health insurance × Urban
-0.1323 0.3819**
(0.1770) (0.1656)
Free health insurance × Urban
1.0234*** -0.0708
(0.3230) (0.3996)




Free health insurance × Log of per capita income
0.2294 -0.2906**
(0.1582) (0.1348)
Student health insurance × Number of
completed grades of fathers
0.0329 0.0033
(0.0235) (0.0220)
Student health insurance × Number of
completed grades of mothers
0.4072* 0.2067
(0.2121) (0.2157)








Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,296 2,296 2,296 2,296 2,008 2,008 2,008 2,008
Number of children 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004
Note: This Table presents only the coefficients of health insurance and interactions between health insurance and several control variables. Control variables are
the same as Table 4
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Endnotes
1See [36] and [46] for review of empirical studies on
the impact of health insurance.
2Vietnam is divided into 63 provinces. Each province
is divided into districts and each district is further di-
vided into communes. Communes are smallest adminis-
trative divisions in Vietnam. In 2009, there are 684
districts and 11,112 communes (according to the Popu-
lation and Housing Census 2009).
3Formal sector include workers enrolled in social
insurance.
4They are both based on the voluntary and payment basis.
5Another model that can be used to model the dependent
variable with zero values is the hurdle binomial model. The
first stage of the hurdle binomial model is to use the probit
model to estimate the probability of the dependent variable
having positive values. The second stage of the hurdle bino-
mial model is to use a Poisson model to model the
dependent variable using the sample with positive values of
the dependent variable. In this paper, we do not use the
hurdle binomial model, since we used fixed-effects linear
probability model in the first stage.
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variables Type VHLSS 2006 VHLSS 2008 VHLSS 2010 VHLSS 2012
Age of child Discrete 9.975 11.945 9.576 11.411
(0.045) (0.046) (0.052) (0.053)
Sex
(male = 1, female = 0)
Binary 0.502 0.502 0.524 0.524
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Ethnic minorities
(ethnic minorities = 1,
Kinh/Hoa = 0)
Binary 0.154 0.154 0.204 0.207
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Attending school
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Binary 0.953 0.907 0.957 0.929
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Log of per capita income Continuous 8.570 8.868 9.266 9.675
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016)
Household size Discrete 5.112 5.019 4.860 4.806
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030)
Proportion of children in households Continuous 0.424 0.364 0.430 0.390
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Proportion of elderly
in households
Continuous 0.047 0.048 0.045 0.047
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of household head Discrete 43.713 45.020 42.537 43.989
(0.238) (0.224) (0.252) (0.244)
Sex of head
(male = 1, female = 0)
Binary 0.805 0.803 0.822 0.817




Binary 0.259 0.238 0.272 0.254
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Household head with primary education Binary 0.280 0.292 0.293 0.272
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Household head with
lower-secondary
Binary 0.269 0.274 0.220 0.254
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Appendix
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (Continued)
Household head with
upper-secondary
Binary 0.164 0.166 0.159 0.160
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Household head with post-secondary Binary 0.027 0.030 0.058 0.059
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Household head without spouse Binary 0.136 0.141 0.120 0.122
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household head’s spouse without
education degree
Binary 0.225 0.213 0.261 0.253
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Household head’s spouse with
primary education
Binary 0.270 0.281 0.275 0.263
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Household head’s spouse with
lower-secondary
Binary 0.222 0.226 0.198 0.219
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Household head’s spouse with
upper-secondary
Binary 0.123 0.112 0.101 0.098
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Household head’s spouse with
post-secondary
Binary 0.024 0.028 0.046 0.045
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Urban
(urban = 1; rural = 0)
Binary 1.788 1.788 0.223 0.225
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of doctors
per 1000 people
Continuous 0.499 0.424 0.555 0.565
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of hospital per 1000 people Continuous 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 2507 2507 2055 2055
Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
Table 7 Multinomial logit regression of enrolment in health insurance in 2008 on the 2006 explanatory variables
























(yes = 1, no = 0)
Being sick in the past 4 weeks 0.3113 0.3938 0.3281 0.3710 0.3199 0.4179
(0.2432) (0.2726) (0.2355) (0.2291) (0.1982) (0.2606)
Being sick in the past
12 months
0.1221 0.1055 0.1075 0.0760 0.0898 0.0613
(0.0915) (0.1572) (0.1052) (0.1503) (0.1062) (0.1387)
Sex (male = 1, female = 0) 0.0752 −0.0018 0.0532 −0.0172 0.0464 −0.0880
(0.1122) (0.1117) (0.1188) (0.1178) (0.1224) (0.1128)
Age of child 0.0070 −0.0705*** −0.0128 −0.0859*** −0.0121 −0.0850***
(0.0168) (0.0236) (0.0191) (0.0257) (0.0188) (0.0299)
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Table 7 Multinomial logit regression of enrolment in health insurance in 2008 on the 2006 explanatory variables (Continued)
Ethnic minorities 0.2941 1.4191*** 0.5921** 1.6516*** 0.8573*** 1.1182***
(0.2171) (0.3302) (0.2532) (0.3670) (0.2716) (0.4275)
Urban 0.3138 −0.7767*** 0.1799 −0.8826*** −0.0960 −0.8965**
(0.1954) (0.2832) (0.1913) (0.2642) (0.1810) (0.3613)
Having health insurance in 2006 0.9595*** 0.7294*** 0.9028*** 0.7468***
(0.1742) (0.2230) (0.1696) (0.2248)
Number of health care visit
in 2006
−0.0046 0.0084 0.0005 0.0262
(0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0308)
Out-of-pocket expenditures on
health in 2006 (million VND)
−0.0665** −0.0186 −0.0773* −0.0467
(0.0337) (0.0618) (0.0397) (0.0477)
Log of per capita income 0.1905 −1.4348***
(0.1450) (0.1629)
Age of household head 0.0049 0.0008
(0.0044) (0.0069)
Sex of head











































Constant 0.8948*** 0.5061 0.6043** 0.3018 −1.7134 12.5378***
(0.3041) (0.3635) (0.2986) (0.3654) (1.2174) (1.5429)
Observations 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486
Pseudo R-squared 0.0471 0.0471 0.0625 0.0625 0.129 0.129
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Nguyen Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:34 Page 13 of 15
Competing interests
There are no conflicts of non-financial and financial competing interests
related to this paper. This paper is conducted by myself without any funding.
Received: 5 January 2016 Accepted: 26 July 2016
References
1. UNICEF-WHO-World Bank. Levels and trends in child malnutrition. New York
City: The World Bank; 2011.
2. WHO. Global Health Observatory (GHO) data 2013. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 2013.
3. Gertler P, Gruber J. Insuring consumption against illness. Am Econ Rev.
2002;92:51–70.
4. Xu K, Evans DB, Carrin G, Aguilar-Rivera AM, Musgrove P, Evans T. Protecting
households from catastrophic health spending. Health Aff. 2007;26(4):972–83.
5. Wagstaff A. Measuring financial protection in health. In: Smith PC,
Mossialos E, Papanicolas I, Leatherman S, editors. Performance
Measurement for Health System Improvement. Experience, Challenges
and Prospects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
6. Van Damme W, Leemput LV, et al. Out-of-pocket health expenditure and
debt in poor households: evidence from Cambodia. Trop Med Int Health.
2004;9(2):273–80.
7. Limwattananon S, Tangcharoensathien V, Prakongsaib P. Catastrophic and
poverty impacts of health payments: results from national household
surveys in Thailand. Bull World Health Organ. 2007;85(8):600–6.
8. Jowett M, Contoyannis P, Vinh ND. The impact of public voluntary health
insurance on private health expenditures in Vietnam. Soc Sci Med. 2003;
56(2):333–42.
9. Jütting JP. Do community-based health insurance schemes improve poor
people’s access to health care? Evidence from rural Senegal. World Dev.
2003;32(2):273–88.
Table 8 Regressions of health care of children

























0.0982 0.0150 −0.2119** 0.1013 0.0222 0.0609
(0.0950) (0.0160) (0.1008) (0.1247) (0.0220) (0.1202)
Free health insurance 0.3608*** 0.0491** −0.5050*** 0.1437 0.0299 0.0212
(0.1169) (0.0217) (0.1243) (0.1378) (0.0246) (0.1440)
Enrolment in school −0.1301 0.0037 −0.0778 −0.3683** −0.0335 0.1840
(0.1518) (0.0242) (0.2003) (0.1842) (0.0306) (0.1839)
Log of per capita
income
0.2186*** 0.0622*** 0.1773*** 0.0842 0.0538*** 0.3878***
(0.0524) (0.0117) (0.0643) (0.0614) (0.0127) (0.0762)
Household size −0.1585*** −0.0194*** −0.0098 −0.1322*** −0.0319*** −0.0129
(0.0260) (0.0044) (0.0280) (0.0319) (0.0051) (0.0331)
Proportion of children 0.0783 0.1296*** 0.1677 0.5256** −0.0290 0.2029
(0.2461) (0.0434) (0.2932) (0.2648) (0.0498) (0.3386)
Proportion of elderly 0.1184 0.0358 −0.5145 0.5754 0.0128 0.1305
(0.3008) (0.0676) (0.3766) (0.3584) (0.0759) (0.4110)
Number of doctors per
1000 people
−0.5454* −0.0780 0.1115 −1.3702*** −0.2046*** 1.5473***
(0.3140) (0.0580) (0.3025) (0.3341) (0.0639) (0.4143)
Number of hospital
per 1000 people
−0.3128** −0.0716*** 0.9451 0.1576 0.0346 −0.4301***
(0.1284) (0.0164) (1.2841) (0.0962) (0.0214) (0.1280)
Dummy year
(2008 or 2012)
−0.6285*** −0.0654*** 0.4575*** −0.3741*** −0.0769*** −0.1087
(0.0782) (0.0146) (0.0867) (0.0830) (0.0167) (0.0954)
Constant −0.5512 −0.1144 2.2843*** 0.3076 0.0346 0.4203
(0.5732) (0.1163) (0.6500) (0.6882) (0.1312) (0.8111)
Observations 5,013 5,013 1,279 4,110 4,110 1,094
R-squared 0.027 0.052 0.028 0.057
Note: Dummy years: for regressions using the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2008 and 0 for 2006. For regressions using the 2010 and 2012
VHLSS, the dummy year is equal 1 for 2012 and 0 for 2010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Estimates from VHLSSs 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Nguyen Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:34 Page 14 of 15
10. Galarraga O, Sandra Sosa-Rub A, Aaron S-RI, Sergio Sesma V. Health
insurance for the poor: impact on catastrophic and out-of-pocket health
expenditures in Mexico. Eur J Health Econ. 2010;11:437–47.
11. Luong Nga. Phụ huynh chưa tin tưởng vào Bảo hiểm y tế học sinh.
Newspaper Vnexpress, on 26/6/2004, available at: http://vnexpress.net/tin-
tuc/thoi-su/phu-huynh-chua-tin-tuong-vao-bao-hiem-y-te-hoc-sinh-2009153.
html. Accessed 10 June 2011. World Bank. Vietnam development report
2004: poverty. World Bank in Vietnam, 2004.
12. Phuong, H, Tiêu đề: Bất cập trong thực hiện chính sách bảo hiểm y tế,
People Council of Quang Nam province, http://beta.qh-hdqna.gov.vn/
Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=tcb&mid=481&tc=239, accessed in June, 2013.
13. Nguyen C. Ethnic minority children’s access to public services in Vietnam.
MPRA Paper 33611. Germany: University Library of Munich; 2010.
14. Nguyen C, Phung T, Westbrook D. Do the poorest ethnic minorities benefit
from a large-scale poverty reduction program? Evidence from Vietnam. The
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 2015;56(C):3–14.
15. Harmon C, Nolan B. Health insurance and health services utilization in
Ireland. Health Econ. 2010;10(2):135–45.
16. Yip W, Berman P. Targeted health insurance in a low income country and
its impact on access and equity in access: Egypt’s student health insurance.
Health Econ. 2001;10(3):207–20.
17. Wagstaff A, Lindelowb M, Junc G, Lingc X, Junchengc Q. Extending health
insurance to the rural population: an impact evaluation of China’s new
cooperative medical scheme. J Health Econ. 2009;28:1–19.
18. Card D, Dobkin C, Maestas N. The impact of nearly universal insurance
coverage on health care: evidence from medicare. Am Econ Rev. 2007;98(5):
2242–58.
19. Miller S. The impact of the Massachusetts health care reform on health care
use among children. Am Econ Rev. 2012;102(3):502–07.
20. Sapelli C, Vial B. Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance.
J Health Econ. 2003;22(3):459–76.
21. Davidoff A, Kenney G, Dubay L. Effects of the state children’s health
insurance program expansions on children with chronic health conditions.
Pediatrics. 2005;116:34–42.
22. Wagstaff A. Social health insurance reexamined. Health Econ. 2010;19(5):
503–17.
23. Palmer M, Mitra S, Mont D, Groce N. The impact of health insurance for
children under age 6 in Vietnam: a regression discontinuity approach. Soc
Sci Med. 2015;145:217–26.
24. Wagstaff A, Pradhan M. Health insurance impacts on health and
nonmedical consumption in a developing country. Washington: World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3563; 2005.
25. Nguyen C. The impact of voluntary health insurance on health care
utilization and out‐of‐pocket payments: New evidence for Vietnam. Health
Econ. 2012;21(8):946–66.
26. Sepehri A, Sarma S, Simpson W. Does non-profit health insurance reduce
financial burden? Evidence from the Vietnam living standards survey panel.
Health Econ. 2006;15(6):603–16.
27. Wagstaff A. Health insurance for the poor: initial impacts of Vietnam’s health
care fund for the poor”, Impact Evaluation Series No. 11. Washington DC:
the World Bank; 2007.
28. Bales S, Knowles J, Axelson H, Minh PD, Luong DH, Oanh TTM. The Early
Impact of Decision 139 in Vietnam: An Application of Propensity Score
Matching. Hanoi: Report to the Ministry of Health of Vietnam; 2007.
29. Nguyen H, Wang W. The effects of free government health insurance
among small children – evidence from the free care for children under six
policy in Vietnam. Int J Health Plann Manag. 2013; 2013(28):3–15.
30. Baulch B, Vu D. Poverty Dynamics in Vietnam, 2002–2006. Chronic Poverty
Research Centre and Prosperity Initiative, Hanoi, and Centre for Analysis and
Forecasting. Hanoi: Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences; 2010.
31. Labor Newspaper. Khóc, cười bảo hiểm y tế học sinh: Có chất lượng thì
mới bắt buộc. Báo Lao Động (Labor Newspaper), ngày 18/11/2010.
http://thanhnien.vn/giao-duc/khoc-cuoi-bao-hiem-y-te-hoc-sinh-co-chat-
luong-thi-moi-bat-buoc-125046.html. Accessed 10 June 2010.
32. Grossman M. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health.
J Polit Econ. 1972;80:223–55.
33. Grossman, M. The Human Capital Model. in Handbook of Health Economics,
Volume 1, edited by A.J. Culyer, J.P. Amsterdam: Newhouse, Elsevier Science
B.V; 2000.
34. Wooldridge JM. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England: The MIT Press; 2010.
35. Rothschild M, Stiglitz J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay
on the economics of imperfect information. Q J Econ. 1976;90(4):629–49.
36. Levine D. A Literature Review on the Effects of Health Insurance and
Selection into Health Insurance. Berkeley: University of California; 2008.
37. Greene W. Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem
in the Tobit model. Econ Rev. 2004;23(2):125–47.
38. Duan N, Manning WG, Moris C, Newhouse JP. A comparison of alternative
models for the demand for medical care. Journal of Business and
Economics Statistics. 2002;1(2):115–26.
39. Manning WG, Duan N, Rogers WH. Monte Carlo evidence on the choice
between sample selection and two-part models. J Econ. 1987;35(1):59–82.
40. Angrist DJ, Krueger A. Instrumental variables and the search for
identification: from supply and demand to natural experiments. J Econ
Perspect. 2001;15(4):69–85.
41. Angrist DJ. Estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy
endogenous regressors: simple strategies for empirical practice. J Bus Econ
Stat. 2001;29(1):1–28.
42. Heckman J, R Lalonde, Smith J. The economics and econometrics of active
labor market programs. Handbook of Labor Economics 1999; Volume 3,
Ashenfelter, A. and D. Card, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science;1999.
43. Angrist DJ, Pischke JS. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s
Companion. Princeton: University Press; 2008.
44. Sauerborn R, Nougtara A, Latimer E. The elasticity of demand for health care
in Burkina Faso: differences across age and income groups. Health Policy
Plan. 1994;9(2):185–92.
45. Asfaw A, Braun JV, Klasen S. How big is the crowding-out effect of userfees
in the rural areas of Ethiopia? Implications for equity and resources
mobilization. World Dev. 2004;32:2065–81.
46. Spaan E, Mathijssen J, Have A, Baltussen B, Tromp N, McBain F. The impact
of health insurance in Africa and Asia: a systematic review. Bull World
Health Organ. 2012;90:685–92.
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
Nguyen Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:34 Page 15 of 15
